Robert Putnam and an Italian referendum

One of the more significant studies in my discipline of political science is Robert Putnam's award-winning Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. I used to have my students reading this book, because it demonstrates the durability of political cultures over many centuries and their power to make or break political institutions. I was reminded of Putnam's study when I recently came across this map:

As many will be aware, the Italian peninsula was politically divided between the end of Roman/Byzantine rule and the mid 19th century, when the Kingdom of Sardinia united the various realms into a single Italian kingdom under the House of Savoy. There was no inevitability to this union, and even today many linguists are wont to speak of the languages of Italy rather than of a single Italian language with dialectal differences.

The unification of Italy came at the expense of the Pope's temporal holdings in Rome and the surrounding regions. As a consequence, there was considerable tension between the new kingdom and the Catholic Church well into the 20th century. This was partially ended by the Lateran Concordat of 1929, under whose terms papal sovereignty was restored over the Vatican City. By then, of course, Benito Mussolini had been in effective control of the country for seven years. Mussolini's role in the Second World War and his alliance with Hitler's Germany largely discredited the monarchy. A referendum on the monarchy's future was held on 2 June 1946, with the republican option carrying the day by 54.27 percent to 45.73 percent. This led to the abdication of the briefly reigning Umberto II, his office being replaced by a state presidency within a parliamentary republic.

The map confirms Putnam's findings concerning the cultural differences between northern and southern Italy. Northern Italy is one of the economic engines of Europe and the world and is characterized by a high level of civic participation in all areas of life. Major cities such as Milan, Bologna, Genoa, Venice, and Florence enjoy a degree of prosperity comparable to that found in northern and central Europe. By contrast, southern Italy is generally poor, and levels of social trust outside of clan networks are fairly low. Daily newspapers are fewer in number per capita, and levels of civic participation are lower than in the north. As a consequence of these differences the regional governments established in 1970 function much more effectively in the north than in the south, which for centuries was under autocratic rule by a succession of dynasties, including Hohenstaufen, Habsburgs, and Bourbons.

It would not be unexpected, then, that southern Italians would vote to retain the monarchy. Accustomed to vertical patron-client relationships in a range of settings, they would see little reason to dispense with the monarchy. Northern Italians, by contrast, were used to horizontal bonds of solidarity in more urban settings. This predisposed them to a republican form of government characterized by greater popular participation.

Again, not surprisingly, the island of Sardinia, the historic seat of the dynasty, voted to retain the monarchy. However, much of northwestern Italy, also under the kingdom of Sardinia, chose the republican option. I mentioned as well the hostility between the Italian monarchy and the Catholic Church. Remarkably, although levels of religious observance are higher in the south than in the north, the south largely voted to keep the king.

The reason for having my students read Putnam is that the role of political culture is often insufficiently emphasized in our efforts to grasp the functioning of institutions of government. Many Americans think that their 18th-century founders were master constitutional architects, establishing institutions with such durability that they couldn't possibly go wrong. To a much lesser extent, Canadians think the same of their Fathers of Confederation. But this assumption does not quite hit the mark. Even the best constitutional document will remain a mere scrap of paper in the absence of supportive traditions in the people expected to live within its parameters. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation reads well, but it has not prevented the consolidation of autocratic government under Vladimir Putin, mostly because the rule of law has such shallow roots in that country's political culture.

Some observers might think that my focus on political culture risks condemning countries lacking civic cultures to a sorry fate determined by history. However, a country's history need not determine its future. Following the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany, against rather long odds, was able to achieve a high degree of political stability within a democratic framework, coupled with decades of economic prosperity. France, as well, after nearly two centuries of instability sparked by the Revolution of 1789, finally attained stability under the Fifth Republic after 1958. Japan too, after the debacle of war and imperialism, became a stable and prosperous democracy during the second half of the 20th century. So, no, history is not destiny. Nevertheless, those working for reform in countries lacking a civic culture would be well advised to cultivate the virtue of patience as they undertake their efforts.

Additional reading:

• Differentiation and Robert Putnam's work
• Why I am not a premodern
• Orthodoxy and political culture
• Civility and the small-c constitution: lessons for Egypt's future