25 February 2022

Putin's gamble

Last month I posted three brief analyses of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship in which I observed that the division between a largely russophone east and a more nationalist west would likely prevent Ukraine moving definitively towards either the European Union and NATO or Vladimir Putin's Russia. The developments of recent days require an update to my earlier observations. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has now altered irrevocably the fraught relationship between the two countries, and it will likely serve to soften the historic division between Novorossiya and the parts of Ukraine once under Polish sovereignty.

To be honest, I did not think Putin would go as far as he has. I figured he would keep whittling away at Ukraine's territory in the east, as he had done for eight years. To launch a full-scale invasion seemed the height of folly, antagonizing virtually the entire world and making Russia a pariah state. It would be a case of naked aggression clothed in a colourful costume of scarcely credible pretexts. The grand irredentist dream of reconstituting Mother Russia's imperial greatness was something out of the 19th century, which the wars of the 20th had thoroughly discredited. To see it return in the 21st is a blunt reminder that human ambition and greed are not easily outgrown.

What is Putin's aim? and what is likely to come of this? In the short term, he may opt for something along these lines: take over Ukraine and rid it of its current democratically-elected leadership, including President Volodymyr Zelensky; set up a pro-Moscow government in Kyiv; withdraw from Ukraine, except for Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk; allow for "democratic" elections, but permit only Moscow-approved parties to stand for office. Ukrainians will be unhappy with this arrangement and could launch a low-level insurgency to undermine Russia's resolve.

Over the long term Russia has much to lose. To begin with, there will be domestic unrest amongst ordinary Russians who don't want this war. Footage of peaceful anti-war demonstrations within Russia have been making the rounds on social media. Most significantly, given that Russia has attacked so many Ukrainian cities simultaneously, many Russian-speaking citizens formerly sympathetic with Moscow may decide that they have more in common with their western and more nationalistic compatriots. Indeed Ian Birrell observes:

Ukraine is sliding away fast from Moscow’s sphere of influence, into the orbit of the West. The ageing president must know this, as he contemplates detonating another explosive conflict. Polls show a drastic change in attitudes: support for joining Nato, for instance, was backed by just one in five citizens in July 2009, but now 58% wish to sign up to the alliance, and even more want to join the European Union. “I know what life is like in Europe and I know also what life is in Russia,” said Marina Polyakova, a housewife in her fifties whose son was badly beaten in pro-democracy protests in Kharkiv. “I want Ukraine to be a just, democratic country.”

Already in 2019 the electoral map showed widespread support for Zelensky and his Servant of the People Party straddling the historic dividing line between the two political cultures, suggesting that the cleavages in Ukrainian society were shifting even then. Putin's invasion may have facilitated that shift, as fewer Ukrainians are open to the idea of submitting to Russian occupation and misrule. There is nothing like an external attack to bring disparate people together and to stiffen their resistance against the common foe.

Finally, if Putin's invasion is intended to discourage Ukraine from joining NATO, this may have backfired. Once Ukraine has recovered its independence (assuming it will), its leaders will be all the more determined to seek membership to deter future Russian aggression. Moreover, Putin may inadvertently have provided further incentive for Sweden, Finland, and Austria to seek NATO membership. Putin's strategy may meet with short-term success, but over the long term he may have badly miscalculated, provoking not only Russia's neighbours but his own people as well.


5 comments:

  1. Meanwhile, innocents suffer and die. My only hope is that "This is My Father's World."

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  2. Thankyou David. This is helpful to counter the superficial media reports that suggest that the response of "the West" has only been conceived in the last few days. This response has only been hatched in the last few days. The strangling sanctions read to me as a reassurance to Russian dissenters like Mikhail Kasyanov, former Russian PM, who explains the invasion in terms of Putin's shrinking world-view as believed by the remnants of the nomenklatura class of KGB oligarchs that support this action. (see DW interview)
    I also noticed a DW interview with the leader of one of the newly proclaimed republics saying that it had been their long-term aim to rejoin the Soviet Union.
    Bruce

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  3. Thanks for your insight!

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  4. If the Russians do manage to install a puppet regime in Kiev/Kyiv, the nearest analogy would the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (albeit it in a slightly different order). The Russians will face a nation in arms supplied and equipped by the West, not least with Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Russian losses will be enormous. Unlike the occupation of Crimea or even the recognition of the Dobas/s separatist republics, the wider war in Ukraine will not easily command support in Russia, especially as the Russian body-bags start to arrive. If Putin has to use heavy weaponry against Kiev/Kyiv and wreak destruction on that city sacred to Ukrainians and Russians alike, that will not be well regarded in Russia.

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  5. Putin has been extraordinarily foolish, no doubt about it. He has a lot to lose over the long term. I only hope and pray that officials within the regime might be able to unseat him before things get too bad.

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